Meredith Moody is volunteering for CAPA as a summer intern. We’re glad to be able to publish her essay, “The Hypocrisy of a Selectively Applied Terrorism Label.”
The United States’ State Sponsor of Terrorism designation carries consequences far beyond the label itself. It can trigger sanctions, limit diplomacy, shape public opinion, and make ordinary engagement with a country politically difficult. For that reason, the designation deserves more scrutiny than it often receives. The label presents itself as a legal category, but in practice it also functions as a political judgment. It tells the public which governments are considered uniquely violent, illegitimate, and beyond normal diplomacy.
The problem is not only which countries appear on the list. The deeper problem is who is protected from it. If the United States uses this designation to condemn governments that support violence against civilians, then the same standard should be applied to the United States and its allies, notably Israel. Anything less exposes the hypocrisy at the center of Washington’s terrorism framework.
The formal standard is brief. A government may be labeled when the Secretary of State determines that it has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Related statutes and State Department reporting requirements help clarify the key terms. Support may include political, financial, diplomatic, sanctuary-based, or weapons-related assistance. International terrorism generally involves politically motivated violence against noncombatants with a transnational element. The law gives officials a structure, but not an explicit checklist. It leaves room for judgment about evidence, intent, repetition, and responsibility.
That ambiguity is where the double standard begins. The United States currently designates Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Syria as State Sponsors of Terrorism. These governments are not all accused of the same conduct. Iran is treated as the clearest example because of its support for groups such as Hezbollah and other aligned actors through financing, weapons transfers, training, and military assistance. Syria is also framed through similar relationships, especially political and military assistance to Hezbollah and its role in allowing Iran to move support through Syrian territory. North Korea and Cuba fit the pattern less neatly, with their designations tied to issues such as assassination, clandestine violence, safe haven, extradition disputes, and broader diplomatic context.
These examples show that the label is not applied through one simple fact pattern. Sometimes the emphasis is on financing and weapons. Sometimes it is on training, sanctuary, proxy relationships, or historical conduct. In other words, Washington already treats terrorism sponsorship as a flexible category. The same legal threshold can be met through different factual routes.
That flexibility becomes hypocrisy when similar conduct by the United States or Israel is kept outside the terrorism framework altogether. If Iran’s support for armed groups is treated as terrorism sponsorship, why is U.S. support for armed partners abroad treated as counterterrorism? If Syria’s role in helping move weapons and assistance through its territory is treated as evidence of terrorism sponsorship, why is U.S. military support to Israel treated as ordinary security cooperation even when U.S. reporting acknowledges serious civilian-harm concerns? If safe haven, proxy relationships, and violence beyond borders can all matter for countries on the list, then the United States and Israel should not be exempt from that same logic.
The United States is the clearest case because it controls the system it would be judged against. U.S. military and intelligence operations abroad are usually described as counterterrorism, national security, covert action, or matters governed by the laws of armed conflict. But those labels do not erase the conduct itself. The United States has repeatedly supported armed partners, carried out targeted killings, operated covertly across borders, and caused civilian harm in multiple post-9/11 conflicts. For example, the Congressional Research Service describes U.S. operations in Syria as part of Operation Inherent Resolve and notes U.S. support for partner forces such as the Syrian Democratic Forces through the Syria Train and Equip Program. That support is framed as counter-ISIS policy, not terrorism sponsorship.
The issue is not that every U.S. military action is identical to the conduct of countries currently on the list. The issue is that Washington uses one vocabulary for its enemies and another for itself. When an adversary supports armed actors abroad, Washington can describe it as terrorism sponsorship. When the United States does the same, it becomes partnership. When an adversary carries out cross-border violence, it can be treated as international terrorism. When the United States does it, it becomes national security. When an adversary causes civilian harm in pursuit of political goals, it is framed as evidence of illegitimacy. When the United States causes civilian harm, it is treated as a regrettable consequence of war.
By the logic of Washington’s own standard, the United States should be eligible for the same classification. It repeatedly supports armed actors abroad, uses force across borders, and pursues political and military objectives through violence. The fact that it describes those actions as counterterrorism does not settle the question. It reveals the double standard. Terrorism language is reserved for enemies, while U.S. violence is placed in more forgiving categories.
Israel should also fit the logic of the label under a consistent standard. Its military operations are usually defended in terms of self-defense, military necessity, proportionality, and counterterrorism. Those categories matter, but they should not operate as a shield from the terrorism framework. State military action is not automatically terrorism, but repeated civilian harm, extensive U.S. military support, and the use of force to pursue political objectives should raise the same questions when committed by a U.S. ally as when committed by a U.S. adversary.
Recent U.S. reporting makes this hypocrisy difficult to ignore. The State Department has reportedly tracked hundreds of potential civilian-harm incidents involving U.S.-supplied weapons during Israel’s Gaza operations. In 2024, the Biden administration’s NSM-20 report also found it “reasonable to assess” that U.S.-provided defense articles had been used by Israeli security forces in instances inconsistent with international humanitarian law or best practices for mitigating civilian harm, while still concluding that available information did not require ending assistance. In other words, even when the United States acknowledges serious concerns involving civilian harm and U.S.-supported state violence, the issue is routed through arms-transfer policy, civilian-harm review, or the laws of war. It is not treated as terrorism sponsorship.
That distinction is political. If a U.S. adversary repeatedly used overwhelming force, caused large-scale civilian harm, and relied on outside military support to do so, Washington would be far more willing to describe the conduct as terrorism-related violence. Israel’s alliance with the United States should not place it outside the standard applied to official enemies. If the label is meant to identify governments that support or enable violence against civilians, then Israel should not be exempt simply because it is a close U.S. partner.
A consistent standard would not require pretending that every form of state violence is the same. Civilian harm, unlawful warfare, occupation, repression, arms transfers, and support for abusive partners may involve different legal frameworks, but those distinctions must be applied honestly. They cannot be used only to soften the language around allies while hardening the language around adversaries.
The hypocrisy of the State Sponsor of Terrorism label is that it presents itself as neutral while operating as a tool of power. It punishes governments Washington already opposes while shielding the United States and Israel from the same scrutiny. That does not make the actions of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, or Syria defensible. Governments that support violence against civilians should face consequences. Yet the United States cannot credibly claim to oppose state-backed violence while exempting itself and its closest allies from the standard it applies to others.
The State Sponsor of Terrorism label should not be abandoned. It should be applied consistently. If Washington uses the label to condemn governments that support or enable violence against civilians, then the United States and Israel should face that same classification. Anything less reveals the label as not a neutral measure of terrorism sponsorship, but a selective instrument of U.S. foreign policy.